Labour, Courts, and the Cunning of History by Fudge, Judy
1   Just Labour: A Canadian Journal of Work and Society—Volume 16—Spring 2010   
 
 
LABOUR, COURTS, AND THE CUNNING OF HISTORY 
 
Judy Fudge* 
Professor and Lansdowne Chair,  
Faculty of Law, 
University of Victoria, 
Victoria, British Columbia, Canada 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
nder the heading “Canadian Labour History Reveals the 
Fundamental Nature of Collective Bargaining,” in its 2007 decision 
involving a dispute between the Health Service Unions and the 
government of British Columbia, the Supreme Court of Canada provided “a 
common law of labour history.”1 This historical narrative formed part of the 
Court’s justification for overturning a series of decisions it made in the late 1980s, 
known as the Labour Trilogy,2 which established that the freedom of association 
protected in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms did not include the rights 
to bargain collectively and to strike. History becomes common law when it is so 
widely accepted by legal practitioners, lawyers, judges, and law teachers that the 
burden of proof implicitly shifts to those asserting a contrary position.3 
According to the Supreme Court, “association for purposes of collective 
bargaining has long been recognized as a fundamental Canadian right which 
predated the Charter. This suggests that the framers of the Charter intended to 
include it in the protection of freedom of association found in s. 2(d) of the 
Charter.”4 
This judicial fiat was possible because it resonated with the worldview of 
industrial pluralists, such as Bora Laskin, who were the architects, 
administrators, and advocates of the collective bargaining system that was 
institutionalized at the end of World War II. They believed that collective 
bargaining, and the associated activities of striking and picketing, were rights. 
The change in the composition of the bench over the past fifty years helps to 
explain why judges now are more sympathetic to unions and their tactics than 
were judges in the past. Judges, who as lawyers practiced labour law, whether 
they represented unions or employers, tend to accept the legitimacy of the 
collective bargaining regime. Moreover, the conception of collective bargaining 
as a legal right was promoted and reinforced in law schools across Canada.  
Eric Tucker has written about the ironies of the Court’s use of labour history 
in the Health Services case.5 The historical “truth” that the Court needed to prove 
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was that collective bargaining is a fundamental right in Canada and not the 
creation of modern labour relations statutes. In doing so, the Court relied on 
several labour and legal historians whose research demonstrates the extent to 
which both the courts and legislatures were loath to turn the social practices of 
trade unions, such as collective bargaining, picketing, and striking, into legally 
enforceable rights. While the Court’s claim that “the history of collective 
bargaining in Canada reveals that long before the present statutory labour 
regimes were put in place, collective bargaining was recognized as a 
fundamental aspect of Canadian society” is accurate, it does not follow that the 
activity was recognized as a legal right with correlative duties on employers to 
bargain before it was given a statutory foundation.6  
That there is a gap between the historical narrative recounted by the labour 
historians and courts is not surprising. Canadian historian Donald Bourgeois 
warned, “[t]he historian should be aware that the purpose of litigation is to settle 
a dispute with finality. Whether or not the decision is historically ‘correct’ is, 
from one perspective—that of the court—irrelevant…The court, ideally, attempts 
to determine the ‘truth’ or ‘what really happened,’ but that determination is 
incidental to its role in society….”7 The court’s role is to mediate social conflict 
and to resolve particular disputes through the deployment of legal discourse, 
which uses highly stylized, internally rational, and normative arguments that 
follow rules distinct from everyday conversation. The discursive power of law is 
generally reinforced, although occasionally undermined, by its coercive power. 
Law’s impact, its legitimacy and authority, depends upon the extent to which it 
resonates with other discourses that are widely accepted. Courts are always 
crafting legal arguments in a social and historical context.  
Instead of focusing on the ironies in the Supreme Court’s use of history, I 
want to focus on the cunning of history—the fact that the same historical process 
can, on the one hand, erode the traditional institutional supports for collective 
labour rights—trade unions and the welfare state—and, on the other hand, result 
in the Court’s declaration of collective labour rights as fundamental and 
constitutional.  To do so, I will I will look at how one species of collective labour 
rights—the right to picket—has been treated by Canadian courts over the past 
one hundred years. I will sketch the broad trajectory of the courts’ approach by 
focusing on three illustrative moments—the beginning of twentieth century, the 
middle of the twentieth century, and the beginning of the twenty-first century.   
 
THE FIRST MOMENT: INDISTIRAL LEGALITY AT THE BEGINNING OF 
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY  
 
Courts were at the centre of industrial conflict at the turn of the twentieth 
century as employers turned to them for injunctions and restrictive 
interpretations of the criminal code.8 Courts espoused the values of liberal order 
3   Just Labour: A Canadian Journal of Work and Society—Volume 16—Spring 2010   
 
—liberty, equality, and property. While employees were free to strike, employers 
were equally free to dismiss them and to hire replacement workers. Unions could 
attempt to persuade their employers to engage in collective bargaining, but 
employers were free to ignore these attempts since unions did not have a legally 
enforceable right. The fault line was the legality of trade unions’ and workers’ 
most potent form of persuasion and solidarity—picketing.  
At a strike-cum-lockout at Vulcan Iron works in Winnipeg in 1906, the 
employer successfully obtained an ex parte injunction to stop the local 
ironworkers’ union and its members from picketing to prevent the use of 
replacement workers during the dispute. At issue was the scope of the criminal 
code prohibition against watching and besetting to restrict peaceful picketing. 
Almost three years after the beginning of the dispute, the union had its day in 
court, with Justice Mathers, who would later head the federal Royal Commission 
into the Winnipeg general strike, presiding. Not only did he make the injunction 
perpetual, he awarded Vulcan $500 in damages. According to him, “the 
persuasion, to be legal, must be such as to leave it to the absolutely free and 
untrammelled will of the workman as to whether or not he will terminate his 
employment.”9 Against this freedom, he contrasted the union’s jurisdiction over 
its members, “with all of its coercive machinery and power,”to penalize for a 
refusal to obey its mandate.10  
Workers and their unions saw that their privileges to strike and to engage in 
other persuasive tactics to promote collective bargaining were being undermined 
by a judiciary bent on preserving a slanted vision of public order and protecting 
employers’ rights of property and contract. To them, their precarious legislative 
victories were being attacked by judicial decree.   
 
THE SECOND MOMENT: INDISTRIAL PLURALISM AND THE POST-WAR 
COMPROMISE  
 
In 1944, the federal government used its wartime power to enact collective 
bargaining legislation. While legislation translated workers’ legal privilege to 
join a trade union into a legal right (with a concomitant restriction on the 
employer’s right to dismiss an employee for joining a trade union), it did nothing 
to relieve workers from restrictions on their freedom to act collectively. 
Employers were still free to exercise their property rights and freedom to 
contract, and to seek to enforce them in the courts. Nor did the legislation impose 
a collective agreement in order to resolve a dispute. The privilege to resort to 
industrial sanctions—the ultimate measure of bargaining power—continued to 
determine the contents of collective agreements.  
Despite the emphasis of industrial pluralism on the need for specialized 
tribunals to interpret and to administer collective bargaining legislation, the 
judiciary continued to play an important role in limning the contours of 
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industrial legality. In the decades after World War II, employers still attempted 
to use old-style coercion to enforce their common law rights. While there were 
strong supporters of industrial pluralism on the bench (Ivan Rand and Bora 
Laskin are the most prominent examples), the majority of judges were committed 
to the individualism and traditional contract and property rights recognized by 
the common law. 
Writing in 1960, Harry Arthurs captured the growing sense of crisis 
produced by the confrontation between unions and employers over industrial 
legality: “[t]he lusty and forgivable infant that was trade unionism fifteen years 
ago has developed in public, legislative, and judicial imagery, into a churlish 
adolescent.”11 The call to make trade unions “responsible” —to respect collective 
agreements, to eschew secondary action, and to manage workplace discontent—
was revived amongst the legal elites. From the perspective of trade unionists, 
however, the imagery was quite different. They perceived employers becoming 
more antagonistic, governments passing labour legislation hostile to union 
interests, and judges unfairly granting injunctions against picketing.12 
The 1963 Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Hersees of Woodstock v. 
Goldstein, a much-cited case concerning peaceful picketing at the site of a third 
party who had commercial dealings with the target employer, illustrates the 
judicial response to irresponsible unions.13 In this decision, Justice J.B. 
Aylesworth, who was counsel for the big three automakers during the hearings 
on Ontario’s first collective bargaining legislation in 1943, issued a ringing 
judicial affirmation of the traditional view of liberal order, the same year that 
Bora Laskin, who represented the car manufacturers’ nemesis, the Canadian 
Congress of Labour, at those hearings, joined him on the bench. Justice 
Aylesworth declared that secondary picketing, even it peaceful, was a civil 
wrong that could be enjoined: 
 
The right, if there be such a right, of the [union officials] to engage in secondary 
picketing of the appellant’s premises must give way to the appellant’s right to trade: 
the former assuming it to be a legal right, is exercised for the benefit of a particular 
class only while the later is a right far more fundamental and of greater importance, 
in my view, as one in which its exercise affects and is for the benefit of the 
community at large.14 
 
From the end of World War II until well after the advent of the Charter, the 
predominant inclination of the majority of judges was to restrict unions’ and 
workers’ collective action, although there was some dissent. In a series of 
Supreme Court of Canada decisions in the late 1980s and early 1990s, collective 
bargaining was considered to be a modern legislative, and, hence, not a 
fundamental right, unions were analogized to gun clubs and the activity of 
striking likened to playing golf,15 and picketing was regarding as a signal that 
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invoked a Pavolvian response from working people.16 Responsible unions 
occasionally turned to the courts to vindicate their rights, but they did so with 
much less frequency and much less success than employers.  
 
THE THIRD MOMENT: LABOUR RIGHTS AS CONSITUTIONAL 
PROTECTED RIGHTS  
 
A change in the judicial attitude towards picketing was discernable on the 
cusp of the new millennium.  On several occasions, Justice Ian T. Donald, who 
had appeared as counsel for a variety of trade unions, managed to persuade a 
majority of his fellow and sister judges on the British Columbia Court of Appeal, 
a court that was particularly hostile to union pickets, that picketing was a 
legitimate tactic during a labour dispute.17  In 1998, he declared, “[t]he parties are 
engaged in an economic struggle. The union and its members have only two 
lawful weapons, the withdrawal of labour and picketing.  Having exercised their 
right to picket peacefully, they should not have to operate with the sword of 
contempt over their heads.”18 Later he held that the signalling effect of picketing 
did not make it wrongful.19 
The Supreme Court of Canada also began to distance itself from the earlier 
judicial approach to picketing. In a 2002 decision that dealt with the legality of 
secondary picketing, the Supreme Court of Canada stated:  
 
The decision in Hersees … reflects a deep distrust of unions and collective action in 
labour disputes. An expressive act that is legal and legitimate if done by an 
individual suddenly becomes illegal when done in concert with others.  Aylesworth 
J.A.’s reasons reflect the common sentiments of early 19th century legislation and 
subsequent judgments which held that the combination of workers in pursuit of their 
economic interest was unlawful and against public policy…  The effect of these 
judgments was to discount the importance of freedom of expression in the labour 
law context.20 
 
However, the fact that secondary picketing was not per se illegal did not 
mean that it was unregulated. The Court preferred a wrongful action approach 
as the method of regulating secondary picketing because of its flexibility: 
 
Courts may intervene and preserve the interests of third parties or the struck 
employer where picketing activity crosses the line and becomes tortious or criminal 
in nature.  It is in this sense that third parties will be protected from “undue” harm in 
a labour dispute.  Torts such as trespass, intimidation, nuisance and inducing breach 
of contract will protect property interests and ensure free access to private premises.  
Rights arising out of contracts or business relationships will also receive basic 
protection.  Torts, themselves the creatures of common law, may grow and be 
adapted to current needs. 21 
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Thus, given the arsenal of general legal tools available to employers to restrict 
unruly union behaviour, the Court concluded that there was no need for 
doctrines that were specifically designed for trade unions. 
Eric Tucker speculates that the change in judicial attitude was, at least in part, 
“contingent on a shift in the judicial imagery of organized labour from the 
‘churlish adolescent’ that Harry Arthurs described in 1960 to that of a senior 
citizen who no longer poses a threat to others and [who] is losing her capacity to 
cope in an increasingly hostile environment.”22  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Recognizing collective bargaining as a fundamental right in the Health 
Services, the Supreme Court of Canada emphasized the significance of collective 
bargaining to fundamental Canadian values. According to the Court, 
“[c]ollective bargaining … enhances the Charter value of equality.  One of the 
fundamental achievements of collective bargaining is to palliate the historical 
inequality between employers and employees.”23  
But, however much the Health Service Sector case may signal a brave new 
world of freedom of association jurisprudence, it does not herald a brave new 
world of work. The problem is that the Supreme Court appears to have grasped 
the inner logic and significance of industrial pluralism, like the owl of Minerva, 
at the moment of its waning.  
Industrial pluralism was designed for the post-war economy, and even at its 
apogee covered less than half of the working population in Canada. Since the 
early 1980s, at the very time the Charter was entrenched, this system has proven 
to be less effective; the wages of unionized workers have stagnated and union 
density has declined.24 The problem is that the primary institutions of Fordism—
the welfare state, the large vertically integrated firm, and industrial unions—no 
longer work because they no longer fit with the dominant forms of governance 
and prevailing forms of economic organization in a global and networked post-
Fordist world. Thus, it is important to historicize, and not to fetishize, the past if 
we are to learn any lessons from it. 
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